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The Press and the Tet Offensive
Keith Gunter
History 407
1 st Reader: Dr. Sil
2nd Reader: Dr. Rector
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The Tet Offensive was a military setback for the National
Liberation I'rontr Yet it was a consi-derable psychologi-cal and
potitical victory for Lhem. One of the major aspects of this
victory is the fact that Tet turned the United States media
against its own government. It widened the credibility gap
and emboldened critics of the war. In the long run of the Viet
Cong's victory is how Tet managed to change United States policy
toward the Vietnam War. The asserti-ons I have made thus far
are shown in Newsweek's coverage before and after Tet. The
purpose of my Paper is to describe Newswee k's and U.S. News
and World Report t s coverage of Tet, show how each magazine's
opinion of war policy changed after Tet, to show that these
magazines felt betrayed by the government, and how this betrayal
was responsi-b1e for a bias assessment of Tet. I also intend
to compare what each magazine said about Tet to that of later
authors i-n order to prove just how bias the magazines were'
It is necessary to understand the story of Tet before I
start to talk about Newsweek's coverage of the event. The
morning of January 31 about 80r000 North Vietnamese regulars
attacked over 1 00 cities in south vietnam. They attacked 35
of the 44 provinciat capitals, 36 towns, and numerous villages
and hamlets. 
-These 
regulars had been covertly entering Saigon
weeks before in preparation for Tet. The goal of Tet was not




to the united states that the North vietnamese
to fiqht. Another goal of Tet was to cause a
against the government of Vietnam' ( 1 )
The Communist forces were encouraged to"
move forward aggressively to carry out decisive and repeated
attacks i1 ora6i to annihilate as many American, Satellite,
andPuppett.""p"aSpossibleinconjunctionwithpo}itical
,ti"ggil" and mllitary proselyting activities. . . Display
to the utmost v"", reiroiutionary heroism by surmounting
aII hardships ind difficulties and making sacrifices as
to be able Lo fight continually and aggressively. Be
preparedtosmashallenemycounterattacksandmaintain
;;;; revolutionary standpoint under all circumstances.
Be resolute in achieving continuous victories and secure
the final victorY at aIt costs ' {21
So one can imagine that the Viet Cong forces were in a state
of frenzY during Tet.
Fromamilitarystandpoint,VietCongsufferedamajor
defeat at Tet, having lost half of their committed forces and
a fourth of their regular force. They faited to achieve any
kind of tactical advantage or strategic position. Yet, the
psychologicalvictorytheyachievedwasworthmorethanany
of these rosses. The united states troops became demoralized
because their superiors had previously told them that they were
winning the war. (3)
Theobjectiveoftheoffensivewastoendthestalemate
by speeding up the revolutionary process. one of the big goals
was to destroy the saigon regime through a general uprising'
Bylaunchingmultiplemilitaryoffensivestoweardownthe
regime, the North vj-etnamese hoped to achieve victory or a
favorable negotiated settlement' (4)
Havinq gj-ven a brief Summary of what Tet was about, I would
I
like to discuss how Newsweek felt about Vi-etnam and the United
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States policy toward Vietnam before the Tet Offensive. The
October 23, 1967 issue of Newsweek talked about a Press
conference and the debate that occurred over how the war should
be handled. The evidence suggests that Newsweek was in favor
of the war because various articles make figures like Secretary
of SLate Dean Rusk look like a champion who is defending
Johnson's policies against the his cowardly critics. This is
suggested in statements that SaYr "For Dean Rusk, the decision
to counterattack in force afforded a welcome opportunity to
lambaste his critics in public with the same kind of raw-hiding
he has meted out to them in private, and he set about this task
with rare fire." (5) Newsweek continued and said, "He told
advocates of withdrawal from Vietnam that such a move would
place the United States in 'mortal danger' and could lead to
'catastrophe for all mankind." (6) The reporting that emphasized
these kinds of remarks suggests that Newsweek is going along
with the "Domi-no Theory". The "Domino Theory" states that should
one country faI1 to communism, then aII others around it will
do the same. I should not be too critical of Newsweek for buYing
into this theory, because most of the nation believed in it.
l7t
Newsweekrs tone changed considerably
offensive. I think that one of the most
is written about Tet is the one they have
Attacks". This article depicted how Tet









,'Hanoi Attacks" starts out by talking about how the
confident Americans were taken off guard by a "wel1-coordinated
guerrilla offensive" that even managed to "penetrate the very
u.s. Embassy compound."(8) statements Iike this seem to
contradict what many authors today know about Tet. Many think
that the offensive was not very well coordinated and that the
attack against the united states Embassy was easily repulsed.
For example, Marc Gilbert in his book entitled The Tet Offensive
states that Tet, "failed to achieve the objective of a mass
uprising and ultimately 1ed to a weakening of Communist military
strength in the South for several years.rr (9)
"Hanoi Attacks" di-scussed three major, immediate
conseguences of Tet. The first was, "It put a damper on talk
of a bombing pause and a guick move to the negotlating table.l'
This first conseguence seems to be pure reporting, and it seemed
to be a reasonable conclusion. The second conseguence stated,
"The VC offensive opened Westmoreland and the Administratj-on
to criticism for failing to head off attacks.'' When Newsweek
talked about this consequence, it seems to be pointing out how
narrow-minded the United States military and government are
by thinking only about Tetrs military impact. Newsweek suggested
that the government and the military failed to see the
devastating psychological impact that Tet had on all the folks
at home. The finally, the magazine states that, "shocking as
the week's developments were, they were not likely to alter
the fundamental American commitment to see the war through to
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an honorable conclusion or change the Administration'S basic
policy.,' Newsweek seems to still be a litt1e loyal toward the
war effort, even though the magazine's articles seemed more
skeptical. I think tha t Newsweek is walking a fine line between
being overly criticalT and not critical enough of the situation
in Vietnam. (10)
Everett G. Martin writes in Newsweek an interesting article
about the devastating effect that Tet had upon south vietnam'
He also seems to be critical toward any optimistic outlook about
the impacl of Tet. Eor example, he calls a statement made by
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker that the Vietnameses resentment
of Tet will hurt the viet congr ets politically "wishful
thinking." Martin also points out that the Saigon government
and the Americans have failed to win the people over' For
example, he states, "And one can only imagine the reaction of
the citizens of the heavily populated cities of saigon, cholon,
and Hue to being bombarded by their own planes in the desperate
effort to kiII the guerrillas in their midst." (11 )
Kenneth Crawford wrote an art icle for Newsweek that comPared
Tet to Pear Harbor. He speculated that Tet could be a "costly
coupil for the viet cong. But he also conceded that it now gives
General Giap the initiative in the war. He states, "For the
time being, anyway, General Giap can call the tune." He also
asserts that the attacks were more te11in9 in the united states
than in vietnam. crawfordrs optimism is founded upon two
entirely different situations that are not even remotely similar'
His article only serves to bring uninformed citizens false hope
rt
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that Vietnam is not a situation where the enemy is war itself.
(12)
Newsweek really started being negative toward the war in
a March 18 article that talked about how the U.S. troops are
on egual terms with the Viet Cong no matter how many more are
sent. It is no coincidence that this grim prediction comes
after Tet. This article is further proof that Newsweek is
growing even more pessimistic after the Tet offensi-ve. I find
it ironi-c that Tet was really a military victory for the United
States due to the large amount of casualties inflicted upon
the Viet Cong, and yet articles like this one make it sound
like the United States troops were pounded. Newsweek states,
"U.S. commanders have Sought to maintain four-to-one combat
superiority. But in the aftermath of the communist Tet
offensive, thaL advantage has virtually vanished. Today, for
the first time in the war, the U.S. and its allies face their
enemy on a one-to-one basis." Statements like these make Tet
look like the reason for a grim situation that I think has been
blown way out of proportion. The only major damage that Tet
caused to the U.S. troops was the psychological damage that
occurs after any kind of surprise attack, and of course the
loss of 1ife. (13)
The article that I just mentioned extensively describes
the siege of Khe Sanh and how it is a major setback to the United
States. The onty problem in this idea is that Khe Sanh was
never a major objective of the Viet Cong. In fact it was merely
a diversion for U.S. troops so they would be less prepared for
,
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Tet. Yet Khe Sanh served as a major point in the case against
any kind of optimism for the U.S. military position in Vietnam
and was given far too much significance in my opinion. (14)
This very article continues to berate the United States
policy in Vietnam and really starts to get critical toward the
end. This is apparent when it says, "From the spring of 1965,
when U.S. troops were ordered into combat for the first time,
the war has been progressively 'Americanizedt to the point where
today the Saigon government and its army sometimes seem almost
like supernumeries." Newsweek has clearly shifted their opinion
of the war at this point. It is unfortunate that it took an
incident like Tet before Newsweek changed their mind. (15)
fn another article, Newsweek continues to point out faj-lures
in United States policy that relate to Tet. My favorite quote
in this article begins, "The Tet offensive-those three brutal
weeks that may have been only the first part of the Communists
winter-spring campaign has exposed the utter inadeguacy of the
Administration's war PolicY ." Newsweek seems to become very
critical of the United States government at this point. It
is interesting how Newsweek t s vi-ews on United States policy
in Vietnam changed from 1967 to 1968. They seem to be on the
offensive themselves in this article- (16)
Newsweek rea11y paints a dismal picture of events in Vietnam
in the article I just mentioned. I say this because it has
many justified arguments that make the situation seem very
hopeless. Once again, Tet can be given a great deal of credit
for these arguments. It shows just how unpopular the war is
at this time,
B
and how bold Newsweek has become in its criticisms.
I think that the magazine had crossed the line with their
boldness when they stated, t'And those who just went along-as
most people usually do." They are referring to how people went
along with what Johnson told them in this quote, and they seem
to be implying thaL they knew all along that Johnson was lying
to the American people. The benefit of hindsight can make people
arrogant, and I suppose Newsweek is no exception. I think that
Newsweek is very aware of the fact that the average person won't
remember what they read a few issues back. Consequently, the
magazine can get away with acting like they knew all along.(171
My final article is yet more proof that Newsweek has blown
Tet out of proportion from a military standpoint. The magazine
sti1l may be reacting out of their feelings of betrayal in this
article. This is apparent when Newsweek states, "Suddenly they
realj-zed the war was not being won, that our generals had lost
the initiative, that the South Vietnamese would not fight
seriously, that the attempt to win over the South Vj-etnamese
peasants by tpacificationt had collapsed, that our own troops
were on the defensive."(18) This quote shows an ignorance of
the military situation after Tet and it belittles the valor
of the ARVIN forces which managed to repel the invaders in almost
every attack. The only truth in this quote is the obvious
assertj-on that "pacification" had collapsed, and the fact that
our troops were on the defensive. Both of these assertions
are natural results of a large offensive. (19)
Newsweek seems to lean toward the government's side before
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Tet and lean toward the anti-r^Iar movement after Tet. The fact
that Newsweek was misled by the government caused them to be
less objective in their reports, which at times strayed from
the truth. Yet Newsweek was not alone in their bias reaction
to Tet as the next part of my paper will demonstrate.
U.S. News and World Report was another magazine that over
reacted to the Tet Offensive. They were on the side of the
government and the war effort when they wrote a May 1967 article
entitled "People of the Week" in which they honored General
Wil}iam C. Westmoreland the commander of United States forces
i-n Vietnam. Upon his arrj-va1 in Vietnam, he was portrayed as
a hero who had come to champion democracy. The article does
not seem to be critical of the fact that the general was asking
for more troops, spendi-ng, and sacrifice. The article seems
to commiserate with the qeneral stating that he is not abl-e
to fight the war the way he wants to due to orders from
Washington that he must follow. The article even considered
the general as a candidate for presidency. (201
Now that I have given an example of an arti-c1e in U.S.
News and World Report wri-tten before Tet , I will give an example
after the offensive. This hiqhly critical article entitled
"Why a Half Million Americans Can't Win the war" on March 25
1968 really creates a dismal vision of the military situation
in Vietnam. The author's main point has to do with the the
fact the Saigon government is so weak that is a liability to
the United States forces. I find it interresting that in the
previous article about General Westmoreland, the United States
10
troops were the champions defending the weak Saigon government.
Yet now this article is almost blaming them for our supposedly
vulnerable position. It is clear to me that Tet has influenced
this change in attitude toward the military in South Vietnam.
The article talks about how ineffective the United Statesl
defensive strategy was aL this point in the war, yet our search
and destroy plans before proved equally ineffective. I believe




third article in U.S. News and World Re orL dated July
8, 1968 is entitled "Can Vietnam Fight it's own War?" and is
further proof of a post Tet bias assessment of the war. This
article makes me think that this magazine has become rather
impatient with the war and wants South Vj-etnamrs forces to be
able to fight for themselves so the United States can pu11 out
of Vietnam entirely. I sense that this aritcle is saying that
the war can't be won, So the U.S. should prepare to pull out.
The author feels that the blame should be placed upon Lhe White
House for the sorry condition of the the South Vietnamese Army.
Clearty the magazine has made it's mind up that the U.S. need
tc pul} out of VietnamT and the way in which they wrj-te the
article suggests that this is a common belief. (221
The accounts I have gj-ven from Newsweek and U.S. News and
World Report will now be compared to what more current authors
have written to provide further evidence for my assertion that
a bias did exist at that time. An excellent book written by
William M. Hammond talks about the bias of the media and why
L
11
they reacted the way they did. According to this work, many
other journals changred their mind abouL how well the war was
going after Tet. These journals considered Tet to be a major
turning point in the war and that peace was the only option
left. One examp Ie would be the Christi-an Science Monitor which
declared that the U.S. could suffer defeat in Vietnam. Another
article in the Wa1I Street Journal was also very critical of
the the situation stating, "The South Vietnamese glovernment,
with all the vast aid of the U.S., has revealed its inability
to provide securi-ty for large masses of people in countryside
and city." (23)
Another clear example of a news bias right after Tet would
be when Robert McNamara approved a report to Congress that said,
"We cannot provide the South Vietnamese with the will to survive
as a independent natiorl... or with the ability and
self-discipline a people must have to govern themselves." Riqht
after this report appeared the news media picked up on it.
The Christian Science Monitor basically reduced the statement
to saying that the victory was up to the South Vietnamese in
the end, Newsweek called the report "McNamara'S swan song"
and underscored the secretary's statement that progress in South
Vietnam had been uneven. (24)
Yet another example of mistaken reporting was during the
Tet Offensive when the U.S. embassy was attacked. The reporters
could not see more than the upper floors of the building at
the time, yet they heard shooting comi-ng from that general
direction. Consequently, they took the word of the officers
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at the scene and fil-ed mistaken reports saying that the lower
floors were occupied, when the only part that managed to be
breached was the outer wall- before the guerillas were kiI1ed.
Even after the news media was shown the error of their reporting
by the State Department in Washington and by General
Westmoreland, they stood by their original error. In essence,
they trusted the word of the military policemen at the scene
over that of the commanding general of the United States army.
This caused NBC News anchorman Chet Huntley to te1l the American
people that night that the enemy occupied the roof of and inside
the embassy. This turned out to be absolutly wrong, and
reflected more where the United States marines were located
instead. (251
To show the extent of coverage that this war had I turn
to a book by Frances FitzGerald in his book entitled "Fire in
the Lake" which gives an interesting account. By the beginning
of 1966, about five hundred journalists were present in Vietnam.
These included, "Senior editors from New YorkT cub reporters
from home-town papers, Ivy League graduates, crime reporters
with two-syllabIe vocabularies, spaced-out young photographerst
combat veterans of Korea and the Second World War everything,
in fact, except a determined opponent of the war." At this
time, the press generally accepted the leadership of the
president, American policy, and the idea that the war could
be won rather quickly. They also assumed that the Americans
would take control of the war. For these reasons, it seems
ironic that these journalists turned against the war effort
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so quickly after the Tet Offensive. (261
There is an interesting commentary about U.S. News 1n a
book called The frony of Vietnam which sheds some light on the
magazine. U.S. News was considered to be a conservative journal
and in the early 1 960s its editor had vigorously criticized
the growing defeatism in United States policy toward letting
the Soviet Union and the Communists push the United States
around. At the start of 1966 U.S. News pushed hard for victory
in Vietnam and prodded the administration to do more when they
said, "What the U.S. is doing in Vietnam is the most significant
example of philanthropy...in our times...for if imperialism
becomes dominant, the right of peoples everywhere to determine
thej-r own form of qovernment will be forfeited." Staements like
this contrast sharply with the attacks and blame that they place
upon the U.S. government in the article given of examples of
their work after the Tet Offensive. It is hard to have a l-ot
of confj-dence in a magazine that shifts from prowar to anti-war
so quickly when things don't always go as planned. (271
To serve as a comparison between the dismal accounts that
the media gave of Tet and what actually happened one could look
to George C. Herring's account of Tet in his book America's
Longest War which gives good commentary about the effects of
Tet. According to Herringr, Tet did mangage to catch the United
States and South Vietnam off guard. American intelligence had
picked up a few signs that the offensive was comingr Yet they
were so occupied with the battle at Khe Sanh that they viewed
it as just a diversionary tactic. The U.S. did indeed
14
underestimate the eneinyts ability to continue to make war even
after heavy losses. (28)
Herring reminds us that even though the U.S. and South
Vietnam forces were taken be surprise, they managed to recover
quickly. The timing of the Tet battles were not very well
executed because some of the attacks came prematurely giving
warning of others. In most cases, the North Vi-etnamese were
easily repelledr yet the city of Hue remained the exception.
Hue took about Lhree weeks to liberate and cost the United States
and South Vietnanese five hundred men, not to mention the nearly
five thousand civilians killed. Yet Hue was the excepti-on and
not the rule to these attacks upon the cities. The Vietcong
were estimated to have lost as much as 401000 troops, and they
would never fuIly recover. This information supports my claim
that the media made more out of Tet than they should have, and
proves that they overreacted. {291
A group of authors who wrote Can We Win In Yie!4g![ have
some good commentary about the effects that the press had on
our country in Veitnam. These authors are Frank Armbruster,
Raymond Gastil, Herman Kahn, I,\Iilliam Pfaff , and E,fmund Sti1lman.
They warn us that the press have a way of distorting reality,
and this was indeed the case in Vietnam. These authors warn
about the power of the press to make fantasy seem like reality
and state that more than one naiton has fallen due to this.
(30)
The book that the above authors have written was done
the war
in
that1968. This book carries a unique pessimism toward
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one can detect in Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report.
This is obvious when they are talking about the situation in
Vietnam and state, "a situation in which the United States,
by a series of i-ncomparable blunders, has involved itself in
the fortunes of an incompetent and unworthy elite, allowing
the standard of national independence--and progress to be sej-zed
by the Communist-dominated Viet-Cong, which is the fortunate
lagatee of our mistakes.r' It is angry words tike these that
support my postion that many who wrote about the war during
that time felt betrayed and carried their own bias into their
work. One should not judge them for their bias, one should merely
trying to point out its existance and how it effected their
work. ( 31 )
Herringrs book gj-ves a better account of what rea1Iy
happened at Tet then the two magazines cited previously. He
argues that to write an objective account of the Vietnam War
would have been hard to do because of the powerful emotions
that it generated for people on both sides of the conflict.
When the Pentagon Papers were released in 1971 | much hidden
information about the war came to light. Herring also draws
upon materi-al recently opened from the presidential libraries
the Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report had no access to
during the time of Tet. The magazines previously cited,
obviously had no access to these papers and consequently they
missed out on the behind-the-scenes information that they
provided. (32 ) Any material written before these papers were
released will not only have l-acked the objectivity that at least
l
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two years after the Tet offensive could give, but also would
not have had all the facts to make an accurate assessment of
the situation. So one could say that most sources written after
the release of the Pentagon Papers j-n 197'l that also made use
of this informatj-on would give an assessment of Tet that would
be of similar quality as Herring's.
To prove my above argument, one should compare what Peter
Braestrup has said in his book entitled The Big Story to
Herrinq's account of the situation. There is an excellent quote
that Braestrup took from a February 12, 1968 article of Newsweek
that attacks official claims that Tet was an enemy failure:
Westmoreland and his commanders were clearly caught
short by the scope and intensity of the raids... And they
insisted on reading the communists' objectives in strictly
military-rather than political or psychological-terms.
Thus, by this reasoning, the enemyts heavy casualties and
failure to hold most of the urban objectives he seized
spelled defeat. The other side of the coin was far
bleaker. . .
In Hue and elsewhere last week, the Vietcong showed
that they could sti11 be devastatingly effective-a lesson
not lost on the people. (33)
The following week Newsweek continued to attack
administration claims of enemy defeat by referring to their
over optimistic claims:
Many Americans thought that Tet represented the sort
of "victory" the united states could iI1 afford. For one
thing, U.S. casualties--920 killed and 4r560 wounded--were
a record high for the war. But even that fact, painful
as it was, did not dlsturb the U.S. psyche as much as the
puncturing of countless official claims, made over a period
of years, that the United States was winning... (3a1
Braestrup thinks that the reason Newsweek considered Tet
success for the Viet Cong was because Newsweeksuch a
so much
focused
publicon Tet's negative effects on the United States
17opinion and the imponderables of vietnam. These include, "the
possible impact of a1I1ed troop withdrawals to defend the cities,
leaving rurar areas open to tcommunist encroachmentsr' and the
alreged loss of 'battlefield initiative' by u.s. forces.,, (3sy
Braestrup seems to think that Newsweek is rea11y reaching when
it quotes an anonymous "u.s. intelrigence expert":"persona11y,
(he said) I'm discouragedr" as further proof. (301
Braestrup is further critical of Newsweek when he talks
abouL them being too concerned with the siege at Khe sanh to
notice that the "battrefield initiative" was either with the
Americans, or shared by both sides. Newsweek only saw the
damaged cities, but failed to notice the united states troops
who were hard at work in the upper Derta. They arso did not
even mention the south vietnamese forces who not onty fought
well during Tet, but were also recruiting, recuperating, and
worried about more raids against the cities by the viet cong.
(37)
Looking back on Tet, Braestrup surmises that no newsman
was capable durlng February and March of 1968 to judge if the
enemy's losses and tactical failures were a significant military
setback. This kind of judgment needed a understanding of
miritary matters, and an idea of what Hanoi was capable of.
The press could not have known what Hanoi was capable of because
even the United States intettigence agencies were arguing about
this. They wourd have had to have the power to see into the
future make such a judgment. Braestrup thinks that the the
newsmen should have only reported the facts and then just wait
18to see what happens next. (3Ay
Newsweek had very little facts to support the dismal picture
the described about the situation of the war after Tet. This
did not stop them from attacking official claims that Tet was
a military victory for the united states because they strayed
from the facts. Braestrup said that the media turned to
"psychoanalysis" of the south vietnamese, and attempts to find
out "who held the initiative." They sought to make their
audiences understand why Lhe Administration was ',wrongr" and
why Hanoi had achieved a great success in south vietnam.
Braestrup concludes this chapter of this book very werl when
he states, "At best, Lhis was overwrought instant analysis;
at worst, it was vengreful exploitation of a crisis.
Historically, it proved unfounded." (39)
Braestrup devotes an entire section of his book to the
analysis that Newsweek gave on Tet during February-March of
1 968 and how they gave extensive attention to enemy performance.
He begins with pointing out some of the language they used that
had its own unigue bias to it. For exampler the North vietnamese
regulars were constantly referred to as "tough', and the enemy
activity was almost always considered "ominous,' in their
articles. The enemy was considered to not have any flaws and
almost perfect. (40)
Braestrup continues his criticar account of Newsweekrs
reporting by listing facts about Tet that they could have
incruded but chose not to. First, the viet conqrs l_ack of
coordination in battle made them unable to reinforce the
19
positions they took over. Second, their plans to capture the
Saigon radio station and South Vietnamese armor failed. Third,
i-mportant strategic bridges were not destroyed. Fourth, locaI
Viet Cong commanders did not commit their major units fast
enough, thus losing their early momentum. (41) These points
support what Herring has said about Tet and shows
decided to leave out some important facts.
that Newsweek
Newsweek had given the impression that the Viet Cong were
"badly surprised" to find that the a11ies would use firepower
agai-nst them in urban areas with large populations. This
statement has been described as "debatable" by Braestrup.
Newsweek was the only one to make the claim that "So confident
were the communists ...that they placed an order at a renowned
Chinese restaurant in Cholon for 400 meals to celebrate their
victory. " (421
Newsweek had made it seem like Hanoi ordered the Tet
offensive out of desperationr Ers having had problems in Vietnam,
Newsweek then sugqested that the foe stilI had "battlefield
initiative" from Tet. The only place the Viet Cong sti1l had
initiative was at Khe Sanh, which was also short lived. Even
sor Newsweek depicted the U.S. command as being forced "to shift
its tactics from search-and-destroy missions to the defense
of fixed positions." (43)
The Journal of Contemporary History seems to agree with
my assertion that the press painted a gloomy picture of Tet.
This is shown when they were talking about the impact of Tet
20
on the the media and said, "Gloomy para1IeIs were all the rage
on tel-evision back homer dS commentators predicted that Khe
Sanh would have to surrender, just as the f'rench did at Dien
Bien Phu in 1954, both instances of siege warfare, both commanded
by the same North Vietnamese military leader, General Vo Nguyen
Giap." (40)
Kathleen Turner's book entitled Lyndon Johnson's Dual War
helps to explain why a bias existed during Tet. She writes
that the American people were shocked by the stories of Tet
because the American correspondents were so stunned. Prior
to Tet, reporters had to go out in the fiel-d to seek out
skirmishes to cover. These reporters seldom were able to witness
fighting. Tet changed this because the fighting suddenly became
close to the Saigon-based news teams. This created an intense
amount of coverage by media institutions not to mention the
fact that it was a dramatic story. (41)
Many other factors added to the inability of reporters
to grasp the wider context of Tet. First, would be a l-ack of
familiarity with the Vietnamese language, culture, and
countryside. Second, was the lack of mobility which damaged
the reporter's motivation to the see the wider context of the
offensive. Turner took an observation about press during Tet
from Peter Braestrup when he stated, "90 percent of the media
accounts focused on Saigon, Khe Sanh, and Hue, where bureaus
were established; reports on the rest of the war, which entailed
85 percent of the Ameri-can troop deployments and 80 percent
of American casualties, were based largely on government
21
information and the journalistic Arapevine." (42)
The news reports of Tet described an opponent not only
ready to continue the fight but also able to inflict major l-osses
on both South Vietnamese and American troops, contrary to the
image of an ememy whose spirit and mi-litary machine were almost
broken by bombing raids and American strength. The reports
also depicted the corruption of the South Vietnamese government
and military with the scene of General Loan, the national police
chief, shooting a prisoner in the head without any apparent
reason. These reports described Khe Sanh and Hue as microcosms
of the entire war. Turner quotes Braestrup again when he states,
"the collective emanations of the major media were producing
a kind of continuous black fog of their own, a vague conventional
'disaster image." (43)
After showing some of the factors that created a biased
assessment of Tet it is now important to expand upon the theme
that the media felt disillusioned after Tet. Walter Cronkite
himself supports this theme during an interview prlnted in 1994
in American Heritage. When asked about his memorable broadcast
in the aftermath of Tet and if he went into his trip to Veitnam
before Tet skeptical he answered yes. He said that he thought
that America's involvement in Vietnam from the beginning was
correct. He thought that it was the right thing to help the
South Vietnamese establish a democracy. He also stated that
he was convinced Lhat the United States was winning the war
by the military. Cronkite talks about a conversation with the
president of CBS News after Tet in which he stated, "You know,
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this country is confused, we're all confused. How about my
going out, having a look, and doing a first-person story? Just
what does it look like to somebody who's shared this growing
disil-l-usionment over the years?" (441
Now that we see that one of the most important newsmen
also fel-t disill-usioned it will be hetpful to study the relation
of the press to the government. Defining this relationship
will help understand why the press felt disil-Iusioned about
Vietnam after Tet. The government poricymakers during vietnam
were generally convinced that idea of globa1 containment was
true. This policy was accepted for more than two decades without
much question. This included most intellectuals and experts
as well-. G1oba1 containment was the idea that communism had
to be stopped from spreading to other countries. rt included
a monolithic view of communism which was the idea that alt
communism was the same brand that the Russians had. This CoId
War mentality saw aI1 communist countries as pawns of Russia.
Johnson constantly insisted that he was not going to be the
president that saw Vietnam go the way of China. These popular
ideas of the time discouraged dissent from any skeptics in the
government for many years. The press tended to share these
worldviews with the government even after Tet seeing Vietnam
as an exception to the ru1e. (45)
YeL the press had a powerful impact upon government policy.
An article in the Naval War College Review entitled "Television
and the Vietnam War" which has an important section about the
effect of neLwork news bias on Vietnam war policy. During the
I
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Vietnam war, over half of the Amerj-can people received their
information about the war through television. The networks
do indeed have an influence upon public opinion, and this was
seen heavily in the Vietnam War. The director of CBS News in
Washington has written, "When television covered it tfirst'
war in Vietnam it showed a terrible truth of war, the cynicism
of many young people towards America, and the destruction of
Lyndon Johnson's tenure of office." (461
Even though the above argument may sound like it makes
sense, there sti1l is no complete agreement that televisions
coverage of the war turned the public against the
Administration's policy. One survey conducted by Newsweek even
suggested that television coverage had instead motivated a
majority of viewers to support the war effort. AIso, Edward
J. Epsteinrs survey of television producers and news editors
for his 1973 book, News From Nowhere, stated that over two-thirds
of people interviewed felt that network news had "Iittle effect"
upon American public opinion. So one can see that a consensus
about this topic would be hard to find. (471
Even if public opinion may not have been changed by the
network news coverage, the politically minded policy makers
are so sensitive to a potential change that they may change
their war policy anyway. If the politicians perceive that
tel-evision has the power to change public opinion even if they
do not, then the truth of if tel-evision has this power would
be a moot point. (48)
Before 1968, the television neLworks stood behind the oval
24
office. The media had bought into the presidents position on
intervention j-n Southeast Asia and the governments official
reporting of the war. Even Sor the shock of the Tet offensive
in 1968 centered public attention on Vietnam and made i-t cl-ear
that the Administration had been giving a false account of the
events in Vietnam. This article in the Naval War Colleqe Review
supports my assertion that Peter Braestrup is an authority on
this topic because they quote him twice while showing his opinion
an abundance of respect. The first quote they used from him
was when he observed thaL there were, "unmistakable reflections
of strong media themes... in the Congressional rhetoric and
in the discussion by the politically active and media-sensj-tive
elites outside of Washington." (49) Tet seemed to have more
effect upon the political leaders then the public on the who1e.
The articte quotes Braestrup a second time stating that he found
that "the press, politJ-cians, and official Washington, through
mutually reinforcing alarms, seem to have been more excited
about the specific import of Tet than was the general publi-c."
(50) So one can see thaL the media had more influence upon
the politicians then the general public.
An article by Dania1 C. Ilallin in The Journal Of Politics
printed in 1984 clarifies the way 1n which the media opposed
the government during Vietnam. This article states that it
is important to note that the increase in critical coverage
of the war afLer the Tet offensive was not critical to the
potitical system. Rather, it was directed at the administration
and its policies. The political system was not a big issue
25
in Vietnam coverage which centered more on specific events,
policies, and personalities. Times when the political system
or popular beliefs, like the one that American f:oreign policy
is concerned with democracy-- did turn into an issue, coverage
for the most part played a legitimating ro1e. Also, coverage
of the anti-war movement generally favored those who did not
participate in it. Journalists tended to write that the United
States policy had good motives even after the Tet offensive
and the evacuaLion of Saigon. It seems that even after the
war, the American public kept on believing in the system. ( 51 )
In conclusion, a quote by Lyndon Johnson during a news
conference in 1968 is interesting. When he was asked about
how Tet may have changed his assessment of how well the United
States had been doing in Vietnam, one part of his answer caught
my eye that reads, "l do not believe when the American people
know the facts, when the world knows the facts, and when the
results are laid out for them to examine, I do not believe that
they will achieve a psychological vi-ctory." (521 Today, even
if the battles of Tet did not achieve a psychological victory
in the militaryr politicians r ot public of the United States,
then it surely did within the press. fn this case, perhaps
victory within the press counted the most. Todayr w€ can enjoy
the benefits of having the facts of the Tet offensive. Perhaps
if the press during Tet had these facts as we117 then history
may have taken another direction.
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